Abstract -Approximation in solving the infinite two-person non-cooperative games is studied in the paper. An approximation approach with conversion of infinite game into finite one is suggested. The conversion is fulfilled in three stages. Primarily the players' payoff functions are sampled variously according to the stated requirements to the sampling. These functions are defined on unit hypercube of the appropriate Euclidean finitedimensional space. The sampling step along each of hypercube dimensions is constant. At the second stage, the players' payoff multidimensional matrices are reshaped into ordinary twodimensional matrices, using the reversible index-to-index reshaping. Thus, a bimatrix game as an initial infinite game approximation is obtained. At the third stage of the conversion, the player's finite equilibrium strategy support is checked out for its weak consistency, defined by five types of inequalities within minimal neighbourhood of every specified sampling step. If necessary, the weakly consistent solution of the bimatrix game is checked out for its consistency, strengthened in that the cardinality of every player's equilibrium strategy support and their densities shall be non-decreasing within minimal neighbourhood of the sampling steps. Eventually, the consistent solution certifies the game approximation acceptability, letting solve even games without any equilibrium situations, including isomorphic ones to the unit hypercube game. A case of the consistency light check is stated for the completely mixed Nash equilibrium situation.
I. INFINITE TWO-PERSON NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES, ISOMORPHIC TO THE UNIT HYPERCUBE GAME
There is always the question of resource distribution under everlasting demands and wants. The contemporary game theory grants a powerful logical apparatus for distributing resources fairly and profitably within equilibrium stability [1] . However, having the solution of a conflict event, which is modleled mathematically with a game, does not assign a way to implement it [2] . For instance, a Nash equilibrium strategy or other equilibrium type strategy with its finite support probability measure might have been practiced only with an infinite number of recurring support pure strategies [3] , [4] . In the case of the infinite support probability measure, the majority of the support pure strategies cannot be recurred even once as a number of the recurred ones constitute the zeromeasure set [5] , [6] . However, for most classes of infinite twoperson non-cooperative games their solutions are unknown or at least are non-effectively computable [1] , [2] , [7] . Then, the conversion of the infiniteness into finiteness is needed anyway. This is approximation, i.e., conversion of an infinite two-person non-cooperative game into a finite one.
Two-person non-cooperative games model a series of conflict events, involving economic competition [1] , [2] , [8] , [9] , political controversy [1] , [10] , social discrepancy [11] , [12] , environmental engineering [13] , ecological incompatibility [2] , [14] , jurisprudential confrontation [15] , etc. In these events, the player, personifying a side of the conflict, often possesses an infinite set of pure strategies, usually being multiparametric. These sets, if constituting the compacts, predetermine non-cooperative compact games [2] , [16] , [17] , which are isomorphic to the two-person non-cooperative game on a hyperparallelepiped of the appropriate Euclidean finitedimensional space (EFDS). Particularly, single-parametric pure strategies predetermine games on rectangles of . The simplest case of the hyperparallelepiped is a unit hypercube. Thus, for solving infinite two-person non-cooperative games with compact players' action spaces, it is sufficient [2] , [18] to solve the two-person noncooperative game on a unit hypercube of the appropriate dimension.
II. SOLVING THE TWO-PERSON NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
Exact methods of solving finite two-person non-cooperative games are based on linear programming or linear inequality manipulations, implying algorithms of Lemke -Howson [19] , [20] or of Vorobyov [21] and Kuhn [22] . Such games can also be solved approximately [23] . Infinite games, if there are equilibrium strategies for both players, are solved in most cases approximately rather than exactly. Approximation of the game is a way of obtaining approximate equilibrium strategies of its players. Since it is much harder to implement the solution with infinite support, after approximation the players' equilibrium strategies have finite supports [5] , [24] , [25] . However, sometimes we cannot even find the solution, not mentioning the support finiteness. And just the approximation into the bimatrix game stands out the only route to solve.
Finding the infinite game solution approximately is sometimes ambiguous. Thus, one wants to use the theorem
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________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2016/20 6 about existence of Nash equilibrium mixed strategies in the compact game [2] or to find  -equilibrium strategies with finite supports, and the other one attempts to convert the game into the bimatrix game with applying subsequently a solver for it [19] , [21] , [23] , [26] . Obviously that the second way is more preferable as once the bimatrix game is suggested then any of algorithms for solving it exactly may be applied, whereas solving directly the infinite game is not always possible, notably for greater dimensions of EFDS. Thus, it is better to approximate into the bimatrix game, which is solved much effectively rather than checking strategic approximation [24] for existence.
Another advantage of the game approximation through converting into the bimatrix game is that there is no universal technique for solving infinite two-person non-cooperative games [1] , [2] , [8] , [16] , [20] , [27] , [28] . Existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in compact games does not mean the existence of a technique to find one. However, solvers of bimatrix games of huge matrix format take large computational resources to get the exact solutions [23] , [26] . However, more powerful cluster or cloud computers can accelerate the computational process even with non-square matrices [29] . Moreover, a particular class of bimatrix games with square payoff matrices is solved into completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies just with the one statement [30] , involving the inverse matrices of both players' payoffs, if they are nonsingular, though.
III. GOAL AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
In order to solve infinite two-person non-cooperative games, being isomorphic to the non-cooperative game on unit hypercube of EFDS, a method of the game approximation should be developed. For this reason, there are the following items to be fulfilled:
1. To define the players' payoff functions on unit hypercube of the appropriate EFDS.
2. To sample the players' payoff functions with specified sampling steps along every dimension of the unit hypercube.
3. To avoid removing distinctive features of the players' payoff functions in the sampling.
4. To reshape the players' multidimensional payoff matrices, approximating their payoff functions into twodimensional matrices.
5. To suggest conditions of its acceptance for the drawn bimatrix game, implying consistency of the player's equilibrium strategy support (ESS) under some form of utility equilibrium.
6. To discuss the acceptability of infinite two-person games approximation under possibilities for expanding the stated approximation concept. 0; 1 0; 1
by and at , where the r -th player's pure strategy set is 
which is isomorphic to any two-person non-cooperative game on a nonzero-measure hyperparallelepiped of with the bounded and measurable functions of the players' payoffs, 
Now the r -th player instead of the infinite set (2) 1  1  2  2  1  2   11 , , , , ,
However, now at or the game (6) by (7) still is not bimatrix inasmuch as the players' payoff values (7) are not arranged as ordinary flat matrices. The sampling on hypercube (1) down to lattice (8) with (4) and (5) is just the primary and incomplete step in converting the infinite game into the bimatrix game. Sampling the players' payoff functions variously due to distinct numbers
may also help in constructing square bimatrix games.
V. REQUIREMENTS TO THE SAMPLING
It is clear that numbers (9) 
Of course, requirements (11) are very formal as they mean that any extremum of the player's payoff function, existing off the boundary of the hypercube (1), must be reached at points, which have only components 8 ATU is preset as a sufficiently small part of the range value (13) . For instance, ATU may be conventionally preset to or , depending on practical argumentations. Nevertheless, the satisfied requirements (12) are not the concluding step in converting the infinite game (3) into the bimatrix game. We should firstly arrange the finite game (6) by (7) 
Finite game (6) by (7) is solved outright as a bimatrix game 
VII. INFINITE TWO-PERSON NON-COOPERATIVE GAME APPROXIMATION
With the help of Theorem 1, finite game (6) by (7) (18) and inversely. Game (21), approximating game (3), has many solutions in forms of utility or equity equilibrium -Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium [7] , [23] , [31] , [32] , Pareto equilibrium [2] , [6] , [33] , [34] , Mertens-stable equilibrium [35] , trembling hand perfect equilibrium [36] , perfect Bayesian equilibrium [9] , [37] , [38] , Markov perfect equilibrium [39] , [40] and many others. 
is not a factor of the acceptance, because the players' genuine payoffs in game (3), taken by the situation whose approximation is (22) , may be unknown. Henceforward, the infinite two-person non-cooperative game approximation (21) with its solution (22) should be studied whether the r -th player's ESS (regarding the corresponding probabilities) 
The r -th player's payoff (23) shall be subjoined, too.
VIII. CONSISTENCY OF THE PLAYER'S ESS
Apparently, there is nothing except two sets (24) 
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To be stricter, it is rather "should" than "would", though: the accepted approximation must have properties that will not be confused under more scrupulous approximations. For every specified sampling step, being determined with integers (9), its minimal neighbourhood can be considered. Due to denotation (25) , this neighbourhood is determined with sets
And for the first priority, the game approximation is acceptable if the players' payoffs in the bimatrix game change no more by decreasing minimally the sampling steps along every dimension of unit hypercube (1) than if the sampling steps were increased minimally:
where
,, ** 12
Furthermore, with the minimal decrement of the sampling steps the cardinality of ESS (24) shall not decrease:
Notwithstanding exclusive importance of (26) and ( 
and (31 
This is a definition of the most primitive consistency for the approximate solution of game (3). It could be strengthened in (27) and (34) 
at ( 
IX. DISCUSSING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF INFINITE TWO-PERSON GAME APPROXIMATION
Finding Nash equilibria in an infinite game is not commonly computable. Therefore, any approach to solve such games is considered a valuable contribution to the game theory and its practical applications. The solution will be approximate, but the rate of approximateness is adjustable owing to sampling. Consistency of the solution and its conditions are criteria of approximability. If game (3) is approximable then it is acceptable.
Note that the limit
existence is still non-asserted. In general, it has not been proven yet that (weak) consistency of the r -th player's ESS is necessarily followed by that limit 
Even though limit (45) exists, we do not know how close it is (in sense of metric in the corresponding functional space) to the r -th player's genuine equilibrium strategy in game (3).
